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This paper analyzes a new way of reducing the major individual tax expenditures: capping the total
amount that tax expenditures as a whole can reduce each individual's tax burden.  More specifically,
we examine the effect of limiting the total value of the tax reduction resulting from tax expenditures
to two percent of the individual's adjusted gross income. Each individual can benefit from the full
range of tax expenditures but can receive tax reduction only up to 2 percent of his AGI.¸
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Simulations using the NBER TAXSIM model project that a 2 percent cap would raise $278 billion
in 2011.  The paper analyzes the revenue increases by AGI class. The 2 percent cap would also cause
substantial simplification by inducing more than 35 million taxpayers to shift from itemizing their
deductions to using the standard deduction.  For any taxpayer for whom the 2 percent cap is binding,
a cap would reduce the volume of wasteful spending and the associated deadweight loss.  Even for
those taxpayers for whom the cap is not binding but who are induced by the cap to shift from itemizing
to using the standard deduction, the deadweight loss associated with deductible expenditures would
be completely eliminated
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This paper examines a new approach to limiting the budget impact of tax 
expenditures, those special tax rules that substitute for direct government 
spending as a way to subsidize health insurance, mortgage borrowing and 
many other things. In total, these tax expenditures cost over $1 trillion per 
year in lost revenues. When we exclude preferences for saving and 
business investment, which would be considered a normal part of a 
consumption-based tax system, the major tax expenditures will raise the 
budget deficit in 2011 by more than $350 billion and therefore more than 
half of the $660 billion of all non-defense discretionary spending. 
 
In the past, there have been many recommendations to reduce or eliminate 
specific tax expenditures that are viewed to be inefficient, ineffective, 
outdated or unfair. However given the political resistance to such 
proposals, it is worth evaluating an alternative framework for tax 
expenditure reform.  
 
The approach that we analyze here is a cap on the total tax expenditure 
benefit that each taxpayer can receive.  We focus on the effects of caps set 
at two percent of the individual’s adjusted gross income (AGI).  We also 
report results for caps at three percent and five percent of AGI as well as 
the effect of imposing an explicit dollar cap combined with a cap related to 
AGI.    
 
For most individuals, the biggest tax expenditure benefits are the exclusion 
of employer provided health insurance or the deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments. Some of the other large personal tax expenditures are 
the deductions for state and local taxes and for charitable gifts.   
 
                                                 
1 Martin Feldstein is professor of economics at Harvard University.  Daniel Feenberg is research 
associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.  Maya MacGuineas is the director of the fiscal 
policy program at the New America Foundation.  
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To simplify taxpayer compliance, the cap that we analyze would not apply 
to all tax expenditures but to total itemized deductions, the health insurance 
exclusion, and a small number of tax credits. (See the Budget of the United 
States, Analytic Perspectives, Table 17-3 for a list of all tax expenditures.) 
This paper also shows the effect of removing individual items from our tax 
expenditure list.   
 
A key point to stress is that, for tax expenditures that reflect deductions and 
exclusions, the cap is based on the value of the tax expenditures (“TE 
benefit”), not on the total amount deducted or excluded.  For example, for 
someone with a 30 percent marginal tax rate who pays annual mortgage 
interest of $5,000, the related TE benefit would be $1,500. 
 
Some recent discussion in Washington has proposed scaling back the 
deduction for home mortgage interest or for state income taxes.  Taxpayers 
might complain that such a targeted approach is unfair in focusing on just 
one or two tax expenditures.  The recent White House Fiscal Commission 
proposed a broader approach to reform of removing all tax expenditures in 
return for dramatically lower rates, and then increasing rates 
commensurately for any tax breaks that were returned to the tax code. The 
proposal we analyze relies on a similar broad-based approach. Because the 
TE benefit cap that we analyze would not single out any particular form of 
tax expenditure but would apply to the total of a all deductions and the key 
tax exclusion, this approach would reduce the revenue cost of tax 
expenditures without unfairly burdening  taxpayers who benefit from a 
particular deduction.  
   
Our analysis uses the NBER TAXSIM model to calculate the effect of the 
cap on TE benefits.  These calculations use the sample of nearly 150,000 
anonymous individual tax returns for 2006 provided by the Internal 
Revenue Service. These tax returns are adjusted to approximate the total 
taxes and tax expenditures projected by the Treasury Department for 2011.  
Because the tax expenditures that result from the exclusion of employer 
payments for health insurance are not reported on the 2006 tax returns, we 
use an imputation method developed by Jon Gruber based on data 
collected in the Medical Expenditure Panel Study.
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2 Professor Gruber divided the Current Population Survey into cells by income, marital status and whether 
or not the household had children.  Using the Medical Expenditure Panel Study data, he calculated for 
each household the probability that that household had employer based insurance and, conditional on 
having such insurance the average expenditure for that insurance by employers and by the individuals  
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Our analysis recognizes that some individuals will respond to the cap on 
tax expenditure benefits by shifting from itemizing their deductions to using 
the standard deduction whenever doing so reduces their total tax liability. 
That shift to the standard deduction is an important source of simplification 
for taxpayers.  While an estimated 33 percent of taxpayers will itemize 
deductions in 2011 under current law, the introduction of the two percent 
TE benefit cap would reduce the number of itemizers to just nine percent of 
all tax returns. This represents a reduction of more than 35 million itemizers 
from a projected 48 million itemizers under existing law to less than 13 
million with the 2 percent cap.  
 
Our analysis implies that a two percent of AGI cap on tax expenditure 
benefits would reduce the 2011 fiscal deficit by $278 billion dollars or about 
1.8 percent of the projected GDP.   The annual deficit reduction caused by 
a 2 percent TE benefit cap would grow over time.  Since the fiscal deficit is 
now projected to be about 5 percent of GDP when the economy reaches 
“full employment” (i.e., at an unemployment rate of five percent), a 2 
percent TE benefit cap that reduces the deficit by 1.8 percent of GDP 
would eliminate more than one third of the annual full-employment deficit.  
 
Basic Results for the Two Percent Cap 
 
The TAXSIM calculations imply that there will be 146 million personal 
income tax returns for 2011, with total AGI of $8.6 trillion and tax liabilities 
of $1.1 trillion.  The group of tax expenditures described above reduces 
personal income tax revenue by $360 billion, almost exactly one-third of 
those tax liabilities. The exclusion of health insurance benefits paid by 
employers also reduces payroll tax revenue by about $110 billion in 2011.  
We do not take that into account in our analysis.  Other deductions and tax 
credits do not affect the payroll tax. 
 
If each taxpayer’s ability to reduce his tax liabilities by using these tax 
expenditures is limited to two percent of that taxpayer’s AGI, the additional 
tax revenue would be $278 billion or a 26 percent increase in revenue from 
the individual income tax. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
themselves.  These data include, where applicable, the separate insurance of husbands and wives.  A 
portion of employee expenditures for health insurance was treated as made through tax-favored “flexible 
fringe” accounts.  
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Table 1 provides a detailed analysis by AGI group.  The first column shows 
the number of returns (in millions) and columns 2 and 3 show total AGI and 
total tax expenditures in each AGI group in billions of dollars.   
 
Column 4 shows the proportion of returns in each AGI group that is 
affected by the 2 percent cap.  This rises from 75 percent among taxpayers 
with AGI below $25,000 (where the health insurance exclusion generates 
large tax expenditure benefits even among those who do not itemize) to 98 
percent among taxpayers with incomes between $50,000 and $75,000 and 
remains at 77 percent in the group with AGI’s over $500,000.  
 
The cap has two important effects in addition to raising substantial revenue. 
First, it causes a major simplification by inducing a large fraction of 
taxpayers to shift from itemizing their returns to using the standard 
deduction since the tax benefit of using the standard deduction is not 
officially considered a tax expenditure (as well as for our cap.)  Second, it 
reduces the deadweight loss (i.e., the inefficiency) caused by the 
distortions of taxpayer behavior that result from the deductions, exclusions, 
and tax credits that correspond to tax expenditure rules.  We return to both 
of these in the next section. 
 
Column 5 shows the increase in tax liability in billions of dollars that would 
result from limiting each taxpayer’s tax expenditure benefit to no more than 
two percent of that taxpayer’s AGI.  
 
The increased tax revenue per return (shown in column 6) rises continually 
from $370 for returns with AGI under $25,000 to $2,114 per return for those 
with AGI between $50,000 and $75,000 and then to $43,337 for returns 
with AGI over $500,000.  Each figure in column 7 is the ratio of the total 
increased tax liability in the corresponding AGI group to the total AGI in that 
group. The ratio of incremental revenue to AGI (shown in column 7) varies 
between 2.7 percent and 3.6 percent, averaging 3.2 percent.  
 
The relatively small increase in revenue per dollar of AGI in the highest 
income group (those with AGI over $500,000) can be raised to a level that 
is more typical of the other income groups by limiting tax expenditure 
benefits to the smaller of $10,000 and 2 percent of AGI.  This only affects 
the top AGI group since in all other groups 2 percent of AGI is less than 
$10,000.  This extra limit on the tax benefit raises the additional revenue as 
a percentage of AGI in the top income group from 2.7 percent of AGI (an  
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Table 1 
Effects of Two Percent of AGI Cap on Tax Expenditure Benefits 
 
AGI Group  Returns  AGI 
Tax Exp. 
Benefits 
Percentage 
With Limits 
Increased 
Revenue 
Increased 
Revenue per
Return 
Increased 
Revenue as %
of AGI 
Increased 
Revenue as 
% of Tax 
Expenditure 
Benefit 
(000)  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)
0-25 61  620  33  73 22  370 3.6  68 
25-50 35  1268  52  92  37  1049  2.9 70 
50-75 20  1250  51  98  43  2114  3.4  84 
75-100 12 1057 45  96 36 2899  3.4  79 
100-200 13  1762  64  95  61  4590 3.4 95 
200-300 2  547  24  92  20 8683 3.6 82 
300-500 1  444  23  82  15  12758  3.4 65 
500 plus  1  1680  68  77  45  43337 2.7  66 
ALL 146 8627 360  86 278  1901 3.2  77   
Column 1 in millions 
Columns 2,3 and 5 in billions 
Column 6 in dollars 
Columns 4,7 and 8 in percentages 
Estimates refer to 2011  
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average of $43,337) to 3.7 percent of AGI (an average of $60,310).  This 
additional cap increases total revenue by $17.5 billion.  
 
The two percent limit reduces the tax expenditure benefits by 68 percent for 
those with incomes below $25,000, rising to 95 percent for those with 
incomes between $100,000 and $200,000.  The reduction of tax 
expenditure benefits then declines to 66 percent in the highest income 
group. This is shown in column 8.  With the additional $10,000 limit, the tax 
expenditure benefits of the top AGI group is reduced by 98 percent, the 
largest reduction of any AGI group. 
 
Effect of the Cap on the Use of the Standard Deduction and on Deadweight 
Efficiency Losses 
 
The two percent cap would have the major advantage of simplifying 
taxpayers’ filing by inducing nearly 75 percent of all current itemizers to use 
the standard deduction.  This would reduce the number of itemizers by 
more than 35 million taxpayers. 
 
Table 2 shows the number of taxpayers in each AGI group that would be 
expected to itemize in 2011 under current law (column 1) and with a two 
percent cap (column 2).  The percentage reduction in the number of 
itemizers, shown in column 3, indicates that about 74 percent of all 
itemizers would shift to the standard deduction while almost no itemizers 
with incomes over $300,000 would shift.  
 
The cap and the induced shift to using the standard deduction has an 
important effect on the incentive to increase the scale of various 
deductions, exclusions, and activities that lead to tax credits.  For example, 
for someone who is not subject to the two percent cap, an extra dollar of 
mortgage interest reduces tax liability by the marginal tax rate, e.g., for 
someone in the 30 percent bracket, the net cost of an extra dollar of 
mortgage deduction is only 70 cents. A substantial volume of research 
confirms that the reduced cost of mortgage interest causes an increased 
consumption of housing services and an increased use of mortgage debt 
leverage, both of which create deadweight efficiency losses.  In contrast, 
for someone whose total tax expenditure benefits exceed two percent of 
GDP, the net cost of the extra dollar of mortgage interest would be a dollar 
because there would be no further tax reduction.  
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Table 2 
Effects of Two Percent Cap on Number of Itemizers 
Thousands of Taxpayers 
AGI Group 
(000) 
Current Law 
(1) 
(million)
With Two Percent Cap 
(2) 
(million)
Percentage Reduction 
(3) 
0-25 2.83 0.86  70 
25-50 10.09  1.38  86 
50-75 10.89  0.95  91 
75-100 8.45  2.09  75 
100-200 11.23  3.68  67 
200-300 2.17  1.51  30 
300-500 1.12  1.06  5 
500 +  0.97  0.95  2 
ALL 47.75 12.48 74  
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The two percent cap reduces deadweight losses in two ways.  For any 
taxpayer whose tax expenditure benefits are limited by the two percent cap 
(i.e. who would otherwise have tax expenditure benefits of more than two 
percent of AGI), the cap reduces the volume of wasteful “tax spending” and 
the associated deadweight loss.  In addition, even for those taxpayers for 
whom the cap is not binding but who are induced by the cap to shift from 
itemizing to the standard deduction, the deadweight loss associated with 
deductible expenditures is completely eliminated.  
 
Marginal Revenue Effects of Individual Tax Expenditures 
 
The list of tax expenditures that we have examined includes all the itemized 
deduction plus credits and exclusions that are not related to saving and 
investment incentives.  The list could of course be reduced or increased. 
 
Table 3 shows the effect on aggregate revenue of dropping specific tax 
expenditures from the cap while retaining the two percent cap on all of the 
others.  The final row of the table shows the overall total while the previous 
rows show the aggregate revenue loss in the eight broad AGI groups. 
 
For example, removing the charitable deduction from the list subject to the 
two percent cap reduces revenue by $22 billion, approximately 6 percent of 
the $360 billion that would be raised by applying the cap to all of the items 
on the list. Nearly all of this revenue comes from taxpayers with AGI above 
$100,000 and three quarters from those with incomes over $500,000. 
 
Subjecting the deduction for property taxes to the two percent cap adds 
$22 billion to total revenue.  About half of this comes from individuals with 
AGI over $300,000. 
  
The largest revenue effect among the deductions is for mortgage interest, 
totaling $46 billion.  An even larger tax expenditure is the exclusion of 
employer payments for health insurance with a revenue effect of $140 
billion. 
 
Raising the Cap from Two Percent to Three Percent or Five Percent 
 
Raising the cap from two percent of AGI to three percent or five percent 
would have a substantial effect on revenue and on the tax simplification of 
using the standard deduction.  
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Table 3 
Effect of Excluding Specific Tax Expenditures from 2 Percent Cap 
(Billions of Dollars) 
AGI Group 
(000) 
Charitable 
Giving 
Property 
Tax 
State & Local 
Income Tax 
Mortgage 
Interest 
Health Insurance
Exclusion 
Child 
Credit 
0-25 -0.03  -0.02  -0.01 -0.31  -20.71  -0.88 
25-50 -0.22  -0.15 -0.12  -3.12  -25.56  -9.15 
50-75 -0.62  -0.25 -0.24  -5.31  -25.32  -10.84 
75-100 -0.70  -0.22  -0.29  -4.85  -21.30  -7.67 
100-200 -1.95  -0.72  -1.56  -12.40  -31.31  -4.63 
200-300 -1.36  -0.58  -2.32  -5.31 -7.89 0.0 
300-500 -1.76  -0.75  -3.92  -4.92 -4.60 0.0 
500 +  -15.42  -2.25  -20.29  -10.09  -3.62  0.0 
ALL -22.07 -4.94  -28.76  -46.31  -140.32  -33.16 
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While the two percent cap would limit the total deduction for 126 million 
taxpayers, raising the cap to three percent would affect only 101 million 
taxpayers while a five percent would affect only 66 million taxpayers. 
 
In contrast to the $278 billion of revenue that would result from the two 
percent cap, raising the cap would reduce the revenue gain to $208 billion 
with a three percent cap and to just $110 billion with a five percent cap. 
 
The number of individuals who shift from itemizer to standard deduction 
would decrease from 35 million (74 percent) with the two percent cap to 17 
million (37 percent) with a three percent cap and to just 8 million (17 
percent) with a five percent cap. 
 
Alternative Minimum Tax 
 
The two percent cap reduces the number of taxpayers who would pay the 
alternative minimum tax in 2011 by 58 percent.  The revenue effect is 
however very small, just $2.2 billion. All of the simulations reported in this 
paper reflect the resulting AMT offset. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Special features of the individual income tax subsidize personal spending 
on a wide range of goods and services, including housing, health 
insurance, and local government services. Because these tax benefits 
substitute for direct government outlays they are known as “tax 
expenditures.”  Eliminating or reducing these tax expenditures would raise 
substantial revenue that could be used to lower tax rates and reduce the 
budget deficit. 
 
Singling out one or a small number of tax expenditures to eliminate strikes 
many taxpayers as unfair.  This paper considers a way of reducing the 
major individual tax expenditures by capping the total amount that the tax 
expenditures as a whole can reduce the individual’s tax burden.  More 
specifically, we examine the effect of limiting the total value of the tax 
reduction resulting from tax expenditures to two percent of the individual’s 
adjusted gross income.  Each individual can benefit from the full range of 
tax expenditures but can receive tax reduction only up to 2 percent of his 
AGI.   
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Simulations using the NBER Taxsim model for 2011 project that the 2 
percent cap would be binding for 86 percent of taxpayers and would raise 
$278 billion of the $360 billion of tax expenditures benefits that would 
otherwise be used by taxpayers in 2011. The paper analyzes the 
distribution of revenue increases by AGI class.  
 
An important advantage of the two percent cap is that it causes a 
substantial simplification for more than 35 million taxpayers who are 
induced by the cap to shift from itemizing their deductions to using the 
standard deduction.  Although some individuals might have to calculate 
their liabilities under both approaches for one or two years, they would 
eventually learn which is best in their case. 
 
A further advantage of the 2 percent cap is the increased economic 
efficiency that results from reducing the incentives for taxpayers to increase 
their outlays for the tax expenditure categories. For any taxpayer for whom 
the two percent cap is binding, the cap reduces the volume of wasteful 
spending and the associated deadweight loss.  In addition, even for those 
taxpayers for whom the cap is not binding but who are induced by the cap 
to shift from itemizing to the standard deduction, the deadweight loss 
associated with deductible expenditures is completely eliminated.  
 
Finally, this approach to raising revenues is far more efficient than raising 
marginal tax rates. Given the need to consider revenues as part of closing 
the fiscal gap, this approach would be one of the most efficient means of 
increasing revenues.
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